Abstract. In this paper, we investigate how the use of a channel with perfect authenticity but no privacy can be used to repair the defects of a channel with imperfect privacy but no authenticity. More precisely, let us assume that Alice and Bob wish to agree on a secret random bit string, and have at their disposal an imperfect private channel and a perfect public channel. The private channel is imperfect in various ways: transmission errors can occur, and partial information can leak to an eavesdropper, Eve, who also has the power to suppress, inject, and modify transmissions arbitrarily. On the other hand, the public channel transmits information accurately, and these transmissions cannot be modified or suppressed by Eve, but their entire contents becomes known to her. We consider the situation in which a random bit string x has already been transmitted from Alice to Bob over the private channel, and we describe interactive public channel protocols that allow them, with high probability: (1) to assess the extent to which the private channel transmission has been corrupted by tampering and channel noise; and (2) if this corruption is not too severe, to repair Bob's partial ignorance of the transmitted string and Eve's partial knowledge of it by distilling from the transmitted and received versions of the string another string, in general shorter than x, upon which Alice and Bob have perfect information, while Eve has nearly no information (or in some cases exactly none), except for its length. These protocols remain secure against unlimited computing power.
1. Introduction. Alice and Bob wish to agree on a secret random bit string. In order to achieve this goal, they have at their disposal an imperfect private channel and an authenticated public channel. The private channel is imperfect in various ways: transmission errors can occur, and partial information can leak to Eve, the eavesdropper, who also can modify the transmissions arbitrarily, as explained below. The only limitation we impose on Eve is the knowledge by Alice and Bob of an upper bound on the amount of partial information that can leak to her when she eavesdrops on a private channel transmission.
We allow Eve to tamper arbitrarily with the private channel transmissions. For instance, she can suppress the transmission of selected bits, perhaps to replace them with bits of her choice, to inject new bits, to toggle transmitted bits or to jumble them around. We allow her to introduce as much malicious noise as she wishes. In this paper, we granted Eve unlimited tampering power even though probably no real channel performs quite this badly, so that our results will hold true in any circumstance. the quantum channel allows an eavesdropper to attempt reading a few bits of the transmission with a reasonable probability of not perturbing it, and hence of escaping detection. It also allows several types of blind tampering, such as toggling a selected bit (even if unable to read it) by passing the corresponding faint light pulse through an appropriate sugar solution. More classically, Diffie and Hellman's public-key distribution scheme [DH] can be thought of as an imperfect private "channel." Indeed, it efficiently leaks partial information on the (not-so-random) string exchanged, even if the discrete logarithm is hard to compute, because it is easy for an eavesdropper to determine whether the resulting secret is a quadratic residue or not.
On the other hand, the public channel transmits information accurately (possibly because it is supplemented by a classic error-correcting code [vL] , [MS] ), and these transmissions cannot be modified or suppressed by Eve, but their entire contents becomes known to her. Newspapers are an example of a secure public channel on which eavesdropping is easy but tampering nearly impossible. Such inherently authentic public channels are commonly suggested for disclosing public keys in a public-key cryptography/digital signature system such as [RSA] . If message authenticity is not thus enforced by the physical properties of the channel, it can be provided by an unconditionally secure authentication scheme such as that of [WC] . In this latter case, a small number of shared secret random bits must be known initially between Alice and Bob, and some of these are used up in the process of authentication; thus the net effect of our protocol in this case can be viewed as key expansion rather than key distribution. Computationally secure authentication [Br] , [GGM] can also be used if protection against unlimited computing power is not sought. We shall assume throughout that Alice and Bob did not share initially any secret information, except perhaps for what is needed to implement this public channel authentication feature.
In this paper, we assume that some random bit string has already been transmitted from Alice to Bob over the private channel. We investigate authenticated public channel protocols that, with high probability, detect tampering and transmission errors. Subsequent protocols transform both strings in such a way as to eliminate most, and in some cases all, of Eve's information on the resulting string, except for its length. These public channel protocols remain secure against unlimited computing power, so that the entire exchange is as secure as the initial private channel transmission. It should be noted that excessive tampering on the private channel can result in suppressing communications between Alice and Bob, but it cannot fool them into thinking that they share a secret random string when in fact their strings are different or otherwise compromised.
Let us make our setting mathematically precise. Alice and Bob initially share no secret information. Alice chooses a random string x of length N and transmits it over the private channel. Independently, Eve chooses an eavesdropping function e {0, Bob know K but otherwise nothing about e or t. When Alice transmits x, Eve learns the value e(x) and forwards the potentially corrupted value y t(x, R) to Bob, where R is a random string representing channel noise. Notice that Eve does not herself learn the value of t(x, R) nor can she influence the random string R (although she may choose a function that does not take R into consideration). Her information about x from the private channel transmission consists only of knowing e and e(x); her information about y consists only of knowing e, e(x), and knowing the function that was applied to x in order to obtain y. In this very hostile context, we show that Alice and Bob can publicly agree on a protocol that will allow them to ascertain whether x =y (with an exponentially small error probability) and, if this is so, to end up with a shorter shared string z on which Eve has nearly no information or, in some cases, no information at all. If x y, they can detect this with high probability and, if the differences are not too great, continue with the protocol.
To summarize, we investigate how the use of a channel with perfect authenticity but no privacy can be used to repair the defects of a channel with imperfect privacy but no authenticity. In 2, we explain why classic error-correcting codes are inappropriate in this context. In 3, we investigate how transmission errrors and tampering can be detected with high probability, and sometimes corrected, at the cost of leaking some information to Eve. In 4, we investigate how Alice and Bob can subsequently reduce arbitrarily Eve's information at the cost of reducing slightly the length of their shared random string, assuming they have an a priori upper bound on the amount of information that Eve collected on the private channel. In 5, we investigate the possibility of depriving Eve entirely of any information on the final shared random string at the cost of reducing its length more substantially.
Before [CW] , [WC] , error-correcting codes [vL] , [MS] , and the theory of finite fields [Be] .
2. The inadequacy of classical error-correcting codes. Let us recall that the imperfect private channel considered here is susceptible not only to random transmission errors, but also to any amount of controlled and malicious tampering. This tampering capability does not directly give Eve any additional information on x. It could, however, give her indirect information, because it may force Alice and Bob to subsequently discuss the situation over the public channel, as explained in 3. The classic theory of error-correcting codes [vL] , [MS] is not quite adequate for our purposes because it is based on the assumptions that few errors are more likely to occur than many, and that errors are not maliciously set by an opponent.
For instance, let x and y be Alice and Bob's strings, respectively, and let N be their length. Eve's tampering ability enables her to actually select xy, barring actual transmission errors. This is clearly intolerable if error detection is attempted through a linear error-correcting code [MS] . Indeed, let x be the private channel transmitted code word corresponding to Alice's chosen random string. Let z be any code word chosen by Eve. If she perturbs the private channel transmission so that Bob receives y x@ z, it will not be possible for him to detect tampering. Notice that Eve can achieve this without gaining any knowledge of the contents of the original transmission x.
Nonlinear error-correcting codes are not susceptible to the above threat, but they fall to an even simpler one because Eve is also capable of replacing Alice's bits by bits of her choice. If Alice sends some code word over the private channel, it suffices for Eve to suppress the original communications entirely, and inject any other code word of her choice instead. This simple-minded attack can be hindered by the post facto application of an error-correcting code, as discussed in 3.2.
Classic error detection is therefore impossible in our context if Eve knows in advance of the private channel transmission which code is to be used. On the other hand, we assumed that Alice and Bob did not initially share any secret, except perhaps to implement the authenticated public channel. A solution is that Alice randomly chooses an error-correcting code, produces the code word x corresponding to her chosen random string, and sends x to Bob through the private channel. She then waits for Bob to use the authenticated public channel in order to acknowledge receipt of the private transmission. Only at this point does Alice use the public channel to send Bob a description of the error-correcting code. This allows Bob to recover the original string and to check for errors and tampering. Thig randomization approach allows Alice to reveal sensitive information to Bob, hence to Eve, only after it is already too late for her to efficiently alter the private channel transmission in an undetectable way.
Although such use of randomness is our main tool in this paper, it remains true that classic linear error-correcting codes are not appropriate because, even randomly chosen, they still assume few errors to be more likely than many. For instance, let us assume that Alice uses a Hamming code of dimension [N, K] and that the random part of the protocol is the order in which she sends the code-word bits. It is no longer possible for Eve to toggle selected bits and to be certain to escape detection because she does not know which bits to toggle. However, there are exactly (2)/3 code words of Hamming weight 3 [MS] , whereas there are () length N bit strings of weight 3.
Therefore, Eve can toggle 3 random bits and escape detection with probability (--. In 3.1, we describe error-detection schemes such that the probability of undetected tampering and transmission errors is independent of the number and position of altered bits. Moreover, this probability can be exponentially small in the length of the strings transmitted. Although never fully appropriate for the detection of tampering, classic error-correcting codes remain interesting in order to correct actual transmission errors over the private channel, as we investigate in 3.2.
3. Detection and correction of transmission errors and tampering. Let x be some random bit string selected by Alice. Assume she transmits it directly through the imperfect private channel, and let y be the string thus received by Bob. Let N be the length of both strings. The public channel protocols described in 3.1 allow Alice and Bob to detect whenever x # y with an arbitrarily small error probability, independently of how y differs for x. Should y be found to differ from x, the protocol of 3.2 can be used to reconcile them with high probability. The reconciliation protocol can also be used preventively, before using an error-detection protocol from 3.1, if y is expected to be different from x merely due to normal transmission errors. The fact that these protocols leak information to Eve about x is considered in 4. 3.1. Error detection. A very simple but impractical way of testing whether x =y is for Alice to choose a random function f: {0, 1} n -*{0, 1}K, where K is a security parameter. After the private channel transmission is completed, she sends f(x) to Bob over the public channel, together with a complete description of the function f Should Bob find out that f(y)=f(x), this would be considered as strong evidence that y x, the error probability being 2-K, independently of the length of the strings and how they might differ. On the other hand, should f(y) be different from f(x), Bob could report to Alice with certainty that he did not receive the correct string. Notice that the amount of information on x leaking to Eve from this protocol depends only on the security parameter K, and not on the length N of the strings (except of course for the fact that K < N). This would not be the case if a classic error-detecting code has been used. Unfortunately, this scheme cannot be used in practice because there are 2 different such functions, and therefore as many as K2 n bits are typically needed to merely transmit a description of the randomly chosen function.
In some cases, it may be preferable for Alice to choose randomly the function f among the set of equitable functions only. This can be done in theory (although not in practice when N is large) by randomly selecting a permutation r :{0, 1} [CW] provides an efficient way to achieve the same goal. After the private channel transmission is completed, Alice randomly chooses a function f: {0, 1} N {0, 1} n among some universal2 class offunctions. She then sends both f(x) and a description of f to Bob. Thanks to universal hashing, the description of f can be transmitted efficiently this time. After computing f(y), Bob checks whether it agrees with f(x). If it does, a basic property of universal hashing allows them to assume that x y, their probability of error being bounded again by 2 -:.
We refer the reader to [CW] , [WC] for definition and discussion of universal hashing. Several universal2 and strongly universal2 classes are described there. Let us only stress here that they are entirely reasonable in practice. For instance, it suffices to send about 2N bits over the public channel to describe a function f: {0, 1} n {0, 1}/ randomly selected among H1 [CW] or P ( 4), once the private channel transmission is completed. Compare this with the unreasonable K2 n bits needed to describe a random function! Moreover, the computation of f(x) is very efficient. Therefore, universalz hashing provides all the advantages of truly random functions, but none of the inconveniences.
As we mentioned in 2, it is crucial that the actual verification function be transmitted to Bob only after Alice has received confirmation through the public channel that the private channel transmission is completed. This deprives Eve of any strategy that would reduce her chances of being detected. For instance, if she knew in advance that the functionf(x) simply returns the last K bits of x, she could arbitrarily tamper with the other N-K bits without fear of detection.
It is interesting to compare our use of universal hashing with the classic use of this technique for message authentication [WC] . The use of hashing for authentication depends on randomly choosing a hash function and keeping it secret at least until after the message to be authenticated has been received. In our protocol for error detection, the hash function cannot be kept secret, but it must be chosen randomly after the message has been transmitted.
An alternative to universal hashing comes to mind: polyrandom collections [GGM] . However, universal hashing is more appropriate in this context because it offers security against unlimited computing power. It does not rely on unproved assumptions, and it can be computed more efficiently. On the other hand, if the distance between x and y is large, Alice and Bob will be able to discover this fact, but they will have no recourse but to discard x and y and begin the protocol all over again by transmitting a new random string through the private channel. As mentioned in the introduction, Eve can effectively prevent Alice and Bob from agreeing on a secret bit string by interfering strongly with every private channel transmission, but she cannot (except with low probability) fool them into thinking they have succeeded when in fact they have not.
Reconciliation is particularly easy if it is suspected that only one or two errors have occurred. Then Bob can try computing f(z) on all strings differing from y by only one or two bits, in the hope of finding a match forf(x) and thus a likely candidate for x. We call this approach bit twiddling.
In the presence of more than a very few errors, bit twiddling becomes too time-consuming, but it is still practical to find and remove the errors by a post facto application of error-correcting codes, as described below. If many errors are expected even when no tampering occurs, the error detection protocol of 3.1 should be deferred until after most or all of the errors have thus been found and corrected.
Many traditional error-correcting codes, such as Hamming codes, can be written in a systematic format, in which each code word consists of the original source word followed by a string of check bits. Given a source word x, the encoder thus generates the concatenation xC(x), where C(x) is some check string depending on x, and sends this longer string into the channel. At the receiving end, the redundancy in the code is used (if one is lucky) to recover the original x despite the potential corruption of both x and C(x) by channel noise. Systematic codes have no special advantage over unsystematic ones (in which source and check information are mixed) for most ordinary error-correcting applications, but they are useful in the present setting because they allow the calculation of the check information C(x) to be performed post facto, after the uncoded source data x has been sent through the private channel. They also allow sending x and C(x) on different channels.
In 2, it was pointed out that error-correcting codes used in the traditional non-post facto manner cannot defend against malicious tampering, because Eve, knowing the code, can escape detection by deliberately mutating one channel code word into another. For example, in the case of a systematic code, if xC(x) was sent by Alice on the channel, Eve could substitute zC(z), even without learning anything about x, and Bob would be none the wiser. This threat can be avoided by applying the code in a post facto manner, and by taking two further precautions:
(i) The check string C(x) generated by the code is not transmitted through the private channel, where Eve could alter it, but through the public channel, where she can only listen to it.
(ii) Before application of the error-correcting code, the strings x and y to be reconciled are subjected to a preliminary uniformization transformation, consisting of random permutation and complementation. The purpose of this transformation is to make the difference between x and y behave as if y were the result of sending x through a memoryless binary symmetric channel. To achieve this preliminary goal, [G] would be better, since these tree codes, unlike block codes, can achieve exponential error reduction without exponential decoding effort, while still transmitting data at a rate at least half the theoretical channel capacity. As emphasized above, whatever error-correcting code is used should be used in a post facto manner, being applied to the uniformized version of Alice's data, and the resulting check information C(xo) being sent to Bob over the noiseless, tamper-proof public channel.
In the traditional non-post facto situation, where both x and C(x) are sent through a binary symmetric channel with error probability e, the capacity achievable by convolutional codes with polynomial expected decoding effort is denoted Rcomp, and has the value l-log (1 +2x/e(1-e)), which ranges between 0.5 and 1.0 times the theoretical capacity 1-H(e), where H(e)= e log 1/e+(1-e)log 1/(l-e) is the entropy function [G] . In the present situation, the original data is transmitted Unless otherwise stated, all logarithms in this paper are to the base 2.
with error probability e, but the check information is transmitted noiselessly; and capacity should thus be defined differently, as the maximum of taken over all possible codes C, since this is the fraction of the original information in Xo that remains secret after reconciliation. Nevertheless, in the post facto situation, Shannon showed that the theoretical capacity is still given by 1-H(e). By arguments parallel to the derivation of Rcomp [G] , it can be shown that the effective capacity achievable by convolutional coding is still given by Rcomp 1 log 1 + 2x/e e)). on their strings as a result of one of the protocols discussed above, Eve has two different sources of information on that string: partial eavesdropping on the private channel, as the original random bit string was being transmitted, and complete eavesdropping on the public channel, as the agreement protocol was being carried out.
We now investigate how to reduce Eve's information arbitrarily close to zero at the cost of slightly shrinking the random bit string shared between Alice and Bob. In 4.1, we assume that no eavesdropping on the private channel has occurred, but that transmission errors were possible. We also assume that the number of errors, if any, is small enough to be handled by bit twiddling (this assumption is removed in 4.3). In 4.2, we assume, on the contrary, that the eavesdropper has acquired partial information on the private channel transmission, but that tampering and transmission errors have not occurred. We finally consider in 4.3 the more realistic case where both eavesdropping and arbitrary tampering on the private channel are possible, so the eavesdropper may gain information both directly from eavesdropping on the private transmission and indirectly by listening to the public channel reconciliation and error-detection protocols of 3. All these protocols are secure against an eavesdropper with unlimited computing power.
4.1. Eliminating the public channel eavesdropper's information. Let us assume for the moment that Eve is unable to eavesdrop on the private channel but that transmission errors may have occurred. Assuming the number of errors is small enough to be handled by bit twiddling, we now show that Alice and Bob can agree on a secret random string on which Eve has no information, except for its length. In a companion paper [BBR] , we investigate how to handle efficiently an error rate that would make bit twiddling ineffective. The interactive public discussion protocol discussed there allows Alice and Bob to agree with high probability on a (shorter) secret random string on which Eve still has no information. Alternatively, 4.3 of the present paper uses the post facto systematic convolutional codes of 3.2 in order to handle normal transmission errors, but at the cost of leaking to Eve an arbitrarily small fraction of one bit of information about the final random bit string. Let x be the random string sent from Alice to Bob over the imperfect private channel. Let y be the string received by Bob. An error detection protocol of 3.1 is first applied to make sure, with high probability, that the random strings of Alice and Bob are identical. If not, bit twiddling is attempted by Bob to transform y into x. If bit twiddling fails, either repeat the whole process (Alice sends a fresh new random string to Bob, etc.), use the interactive protocol of [BBR] , or refer to 4.3. At this point, assume that Alice and. Bob agree with high probability on some length N string x, but that Eve has gained information on this string by listening to the public channel error-detection protocol. We wish to eradicate this information of hers. truly random functions and we refer the reader to [R] for the somewhat tedious proofs.
Recall that Eve's information about x is characterized by the set C of possible candidates, and that this set is also known for Alice and Bob. Let C denote the number of elements in C. Let y be the index of x in C when C is ordered in lexicographic order. Then y is available to both Alice and Bob, whereas it is just as likely to take any value between 1 and 4e C as far as Eve is concerned. If C is large enough, such a y can thus be used as the resulting shared secret. The ideal situation occurs when the function f is equitable. In this case, we always have :C=2 In order to state the theorems precisely, we need to introduce some informationtheoretic formalism that will be used throughout 4. Let N and K be as in Theorem 1. Let S be any nonnegative integer smaller than N-K. Let R N-K-S. Let X, F and G be three independent uniformly distributed random variables ranging over The expected amount of (Shannon) Intuitively, this says that if f and g are randomly chosen functions from {0, 1} u to {0, 1} and to {0, 1}R, respectively, and if x is randomly chosen among all bit strings of length N, then the expected amount of Shannon information given on g(x) by f(x), f and g is less than 2-S/ln 2 bits.
As for the second idea, it turns out that a comparable level of information reduction can be achieved through the use of any ad hoc equitable function. In particular, it is enough to simply chop off any K + S physical bits of x in order to reduce the expected eavesdropper's information below 2-S/ln 2 bits. class mentioned in [WC] , which we call P. We assume here that the reader is familiar with Galois field theory [Be] . Consider Proof This is an immediate consequence of the fact that 7r,,b is a permutation of {0, 1}N: knowledge of the last K bits of zr,b(X) gives no information on its first N-K bits.
In conclusion, use of the universal2 class P allows Alice and Bob to verify whether their strings are identical, with an error probability of at most 2-/(. If they turn out to be the same (or if they differ little enough that bit twiddling is applicable), they can be transformed into new strings that are only K bits shorter, on which Eve has no information at all. This is clearly optimal.
It is worth mentioning that the conceptually simpler universale class H1 of [CW] can be used instead of P for error detection. This still allows subsequently a good, efficient information-reduction scheme, but wiping out with certainty Eve's information does not seem to be feasible. This is due to the fact that the functions in H1 are not equitable. Using this class, it is nonetheless always possible to reduce the eavesdropper's expected information below 2 bits, and even below any threshold ; > 0 by choosing N large enough. For more details, please consult JR].
The following section investigates the situation in which eavesdropping has occurred, but tampering and transmission errors are not a concern for Alice and Bob. Otherwise, her expected amount of information is smaller, but she could occasionally get more. In this section, we assume that transmission errors and tampering are not a worry for Alice and Bob, so that an error-detection protocol of 3.1 is not carried out.
This assumption is removed in 4.3.
To summarize, let x be the length N bit string common to Alice and Bob, and let e(x) be the K bits of information known by Eve about x. Alice and Bob wish to publicly agree on some function g: {0, 1} s {0, 1}n, for some R <-_ N-K, such that knowledge of e, e(x) and g leaves Eve with an arbitrary small fraction of one bit of information about g(x).
A similar question was addressed by Ozarow and Wyner [OW] . However, their solution is nonconstructive (based on random coding), it assumes that the eavesdropper can only read physical bits from the private channel, and it does not reduce her information below one bit. On the other hand, their setting is not restricted to the exchange of a random string, as they wish Alice to be able to safely transmit a message of her choice to Bob. Moreover, they do not need to use an authenticated public channel after the private transmission. Their results should also be compared with our information-elimination protocol from 5.
Back to the analogy with Wyner's original wiretap channel [W] , the requirement that the eavesdropping function be compressive is analogous to Wyner's requirement that the wiretap channel have less capacity than the main channel. One might hope to generalize our setting to cover eavesdropping through an arbitrary channel of capacity K/N, selected by Eve but unknown to Alice and Bob. However, this generalization would weaken our results rather than strengthen them. For example, Eve could satisfy the K/N capacity bound by asking for all N bits of Alice's message K/N of the time, while asking for none of it the rest of the time.
Notice that the effect of eavesdropping over the private channel is very similar to that of eavesdropping over the public channel described in 4.1 in that the information gained by Eve can be characterized by a set E {z {0, 1} N ]e(z)= e(x)} of possible candidates for x. However, there is a fundamental difference: contrary to the previously discussed set C, it is not the case that Alice and Bob have complete knowledge of E. For this reason, it is not possible for them, in general, to eliminate Eve's information with certainty. Proof The idea is to make e very nonequitable, so as to have a small chance of learning x exactly from e(x). For example, Eve could choose:
Withprobability(2/(-1)/2N, e(x)yieldscompleteinformationonx;henceong(x). [3 The eavesdropping function described above is for gamblers only: with probability greater than 1-2/(-, e(x) gives almost no information on x. In fact, the expected information on x given by e(x) is less than (N+ I/In 2)2/(-N bits. For instance, if Eve is allowed to observe the result of a 50-bit function applied to a 56-bit DES key [NBS] , her expected information would be less than one bit if she had used the above very nonequitable eavesdropping function. Clearly, it would be more prudent for Eve to select some equitable function, so as to maximize her expected amount of information on x. Even then, an analogue to Theorem 5 can be given: Proof Should Alice and Bob choose a nonequitable function g, Eve would have some information on g(x) from the mere knowledge that x is truly random, without even looking at e(x). On the other hand, assuming that g is equitable, e(x) could give as much as min(K, R) bits of information on g(x). This is accomplished if one of the two functions is an equitable refinement of the other. Of course, Eve cannot select e so that this will happen, because she does not yet know g when she has to choose e.
However, Alice and Bob cannot prevent this coincidence from happening, or even detect it, because they never get to know the function e. ] The above two theorems show that the best Alice and Bob can hope for is to reduce Eve's information arbitrarily close to zero. There can be no analogue to Theorems 1 and 4. Nonetheless, if we restrict even further Eve's choice of e, so that she can only read a selection of physical bits of x, it becomes possible again for Alice and Bob to eliminate her information entirely, as discussed in 5.
As usual, we consider two approaches for the reduction of Eve's information: one based on truly random functions and one based on universal hashing techniques. Section 4.2.1 is only of theoretical interest, and the proofs can be found in [R] . Here again, it is nice to find out that the practical schemes of 4.2.2 are just as efficient for information reduction as the unrealistic random scheme. [WC] can also be used in this information-reduction context. A similar analysis shows that if g is chosen randomly from an almost strongly universal2 class, knowledge of e, g and e(x) yields at most 1+1og(!+2-(s+l) bits of information to Eve about g(x). This could be interesting when R is much smaller than N: in that case the description of a randomly chosen function within an almost strongly universal2 class requires significantly fewer bits to be transmitted over the public channel [WC] . [3 4.3 . Putting the concepts together. If Eve obtained some information on the string x as it was being transmitted over the private channel, and additional information by listening to the public channel messages exchanged during the error-correction and error-detection protocols of 3.2 and 3.1, it may still be possible for Alice and Bob to efficiently agree on a random string on which Eve has nearly no information. The key idea is that if Eve obtained an expectation of K bits from the private channel transmission, and an expectation of L more bits from eavesdropping on the subsequent public discussion, then she can expect at most K + L bits from both sources combined. This is formalized in the following easily proven lemma.
LEMMA 11. Let e:{0, 1} u ->{0, 1}/( andf:{O, 1} u -{0, 1} be any two functions. Let x be a random string of length N. The expected information on x given by knowledge of e, e(x), f and f(x) is at most K + L bits.
Therefore, an obvious adaptation of the protocol implied by Theorem 10 allows for the efficient reduction of Eve's information to less than 2-S/ln 2 bits for any S < N-K L, at the cost of ending up with a random string of length N-K L-S. Notice that ad hoc information-elimination schemes, such as those in Theorems 1 and 4, offer no advantages in this context (unless an information-elimination scheme from 5 is used initially). Therefore, the choice of a universal2 class in the error-detection part of the protocol does not have to be motivated by the existence of a subsequent information-elimination scheme.
5. Elimination of the eavesdropper's information. The protocols of 4.2 should be sufficient for most applications, despite the fact that Eve retains an arbitrarily small fraction of one bit of information on the resulting shared random string. Although we were able to eliminate her information entirely in Theorems 1 and 4, the techniques used could only be applied because Alice and Bob had complete knowledge of Eve's information. As shown in Theorems 5 and 6, this cannot be extended whenever Eve is allowed to access a limited amount of information of her choice from the private channel transmission.
In this section, we investigate a protocol by which Alice and Bob can nonetheless wipe out Eve's information, assuming that she obtained a maximum of K physical bits of her choice from the private channel transmission, as opposed to the more general K bits of information in Shannon's sense discussed in 4. Although the value of K is known to Alice and Bob, they do not know, of course, which particular bits of their string are compromised. This protocol is expensive in the sense that the resulting string is generally substantially shorter than those resulting from the protocols of 4; however, this is the unavoidable price to pay in order to make sure that Eve is left with no information at all.
An error-detection protocol could be applied, if desired, after Eve's information has been eliminated, still leaving her with no information if the universal2 class P of Theorem 4 is used. Bit twiddling on the initial strings is also possible afterwards in order to reconcile the final strings, if there were only one or two transmission errors.
Unfortunately, the more sophisticated protocol of 3.2 would transform Eve's knowledge from physical bits to information in Shannon's sense, so that the elimination protocols described below could no longer be applied. We do not know how to efficiently eliminate Eve's information and reconcile Alice and Bob's strings if several transmission errors occurred. Proof This easy proof by induction on N is left to the reader. [3 on this value [vL] , [HS] , [MS] , and these bounds apply just as well to our problem. For instance, Hamming codes [MS] tell us that xor-(2 L-1, 2 L-L-1, 2)-functions exist for every L-> 2. Conversely, Hamming's upper bound [MS] shows that no xor-(2 L-1, 2 L-L, 2)-functions can exist because Notice that elimination of Eve's information in this case (K =2) costs L-2-S additional bits than if we had been satisfied to reduce her information below 2-S/ln 2 bits, as in 4.2.
Similarly, Griesmer's upper bound and the simplex code [MS] allow for the building ofxor-(2 L-1, L, 2 L-l-1)-functions for any L -> 2, whereas neither xor-(2 L-1, L, 2L-1)-functions nor xor-(2L-1, L+ 1, 2L--l)-functions can exist. Moreover, Varsharmov-Gilbert's lower bound together with McEliece's upper bound [vL] , [MS] allow for the construction of xor-(N, J, K)-functions such that J is at least half the optimal (xor) value, as long as K N < 0.3 and N is large enough. Also, the zigzag of [BCR] yields an xor-(3L, 2L, 2 L-1)-function, for every positive integer L.
Finally, the general question of (N, J, K)-functions is solved completely when 2 K > N-1, thanks to the proof of the Xor-Conjecture for J 2 [CGHFRS] . In this case, it is easy to see that no xor-(N, 2, K)-functions can exist, and therefore no general (N, 2, K)-functions can exist either. Since the exclusive-or of all the input bits is (N, 1, K), we conclude that 1 is the maximum possible value for J when 2 -N-I<K<N. On the other hand, there is always an (N, 2, [N-lJ)-function. We encourage the reader to consult [CGHFRS] for additional results on (N, J, K)-(alias t-resilient) functions.
6. Conclusions. If no eavesdropping occurred over the private channel, it is possible for Alice and Bob to publicly verify that no transmission errors or tampering occurred either, with a 2 -K error probability, and end up with an entirely secret final string that is only K bits shorter than the original private transmission. This is optimal.
If partial eavesdropping occurred over the private channel, leaking up to K bits of information to Eve, in Shannon's sense, it is still possible for Alice and Bob to publicly verify that no transmission errors or tampering occurred, with a 2 -L error probability, and end up with a final string that is K + L + S bits shorter than the original private transmission, on which Eve has less than 2-S/ln 2 bits of information on the average. Moreover, discrepancies between the transmitted and received versions of the private channel transmission, whether they are due to channel noise or tampering, can be handled at the cost of a further reduction in the length of the final shared secret string. If the discrepancies are too numerous, no final shared secret string can be constructed, but Alice and Bob will detect this condition with very high probability, and will not be misled into constructing a string that is neither shared nor secret.
Finally, if partial eavesdropping over the private channel is restricted to K physical bits secretly chosen by Eve, it becomes possible again for Alice and Bob to verify with high probability that no errors or tampering occurred, and to end up with a new string on which Eve has no information whatsoever. However, the new string will be substantially shorter than if Alice and Bob had tolerated knowledge by Eve of an arbitrarily small fraction of one bit of information. This remains possible even if a small number of transmission errors occurred, but we do not know how to eliminate Eve's information and reconcile the strings efficiently in the presence of severe transmission errors.
